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I. INTRODUCTION

A recent trend by private litigants to name corporate executives as
defendants in lawsuits brought against motor vehicle dealerships under the
South Carolina Motor Vehicle Unfair Trade Practices Act (MVUTPA)' has
aroused considerable interest in the scope of personal liability under that
Act. Threatened with personal liability for the acts and omissions of corporate
subordinates, executives are asking an important question: Can a plaintiff hold
an individual liable for a motor vehicle dealership's violation of the MVUTPA
based solely on the individual's status as an officer, director, or controlling
shareholder of the offending dealership? A negative response to this question
would seem certain considering such entrenched doctrines as the corporate veil
and limited shareholder liability. However, in Rowe v. Hyatt2 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals recently interpreted language somewhat obscured
in the MVUTPA to extend individual liability to the officers, directors, and
controlling persons of corporate dealerships for the misconduct of dealership
employees. 3

1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-15-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994) (codified under
the title "Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers"). Although the MVUTPA
covers both manufacturers and distributors of motor vehicles, this article will discuss the issues
from the dealership perspective only. Consequently, while much of the material in this article
applies with equal force to the officers, directors, and other persons in control of manufacturers
and distributors, the text will primarily refer to dealerships throughout.
2. __ S.C. _, 452 S.E.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1994).
3. Id. at __, 452 S.E.2d at 359. The court achieved this extension of individual liability by
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Seizing this statutory language, private litigants are suing the officers,
directors, and persons in control of motor vehicle dealerships in their
individual capacities without even alleging that the individuals participated in
or knew of the actionable misconduct. Although empirical data is unavailable
on the number of private damage actions filed under the MVUTPA against the
officers, directors, and controlling persons simply because of their office or
shareholding status, the authors' observations and experience suggest that
litigants are increasingly bringing these claims.4 Moreover, it is only reasonable to believe that these claims will proliferate in the wake of Rowe and as
attorneys become more familiar with the provisions of the MVUTPA. 5
This article argues that individual officers, directors, and controlling
persons should not be held personally liable under the MVUTPA based solely
on their relationship to an offending dealership and urges the legislature to
amend the existing statute. Part II provides an overview of the general
principles in corporation law and tort law governing the personal liability of
officers, directors, and shareholders to third persons. Part III summarizes the
statutory provisions of the MVUTPA and the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (UTPA).6 Part III also discusses the specific provisions of the
MVUTPA that the South Carolina Court of Appeals construed to impose
individual liability on the officers, directors, and controlling persons of motor
vehicle dealerships for the acts of dealership employees. Part IV examines the
judicial extension of personal liability to the controlling persons of offending
entities in actions brought under the UTPA and the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA).7 Part V sets forth the arguments against extending personal
liability to the officers, directors, and controlling persons of motor vehicle
dealerships when liability is based solely on the dealership's violation of the
MVUTPA. Finally, Part VI offers a legislative solution to the MVUTPA's
current inadequacies.

linking broadly defined terms found in the Act's definition section and then applying those terms
to the Act's enforcement provisions. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
4. Most of these lawsuits name the dealership's majority stockholder or chief executive
officer (CEO) as a defendant. Apparently, the primary strategy for adding the CEO or controlling
shareholder as a defendant is to coax a pretrial settlement. Indeed, the consequences can be serious for the individual named as a defendant. Sued in an individual capacity, the officer, director,
or shareholder not only may be forced to disclose personal and confidential financial information
and produce private records such as income tax returns and financial statements during discovery,
but may also lose personal assets to a prevailing plaintiff.
5. Although the General Assembly enacted the MVUTPA in 1972, there are presently less
than 15 reported decisions interpreting or applying its provisions. Approximately two-thirds of
these decisions were rendered within the last decade.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1994).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). The MVUTPA's proscriptive language is patterned after the

FrCA.
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II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF
OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND SHAREHOLDERS TO THIRD PERSONS

A. ShareholderLiability
Limited shareholder liability is the defining characteristic of the modem
corporation. Shareholders are not personally liable for the corporation's acts
or debts.' Unless the corporation's articles of incorporation provide otherwise,
shareholders risk only their investment regardless of the extent of the
corporation's liabilities. 9 The corporate veil protects shareholders from
personal liability because the corporation and its shareholders are separate and
distinct entities. 10 The corporate veil doctrine provides that when "corporate
formalities are substantially observed, initial financing [is] reasonably
adequate, and the corporation [is] not formed to evade an existing obligation
or a statute or to cheat or to defraud," the shareholders are shielded from

liability for the tortious acts or debts of the corporation." Majority or total
ownership of a corporation's shares by one person does not by itself impose
any additional or different liability on that shareholder.' 2 Limited shareholder
liability supports the vital economic policy of encouraging capital investment
in the massive business enterprises which are essential to industry and
commerce.' 3 Limited shareholder liability makes investments less risky and
increases their expected value to potential investors.' 4

8. This principle is codified in the South Carolina Business Corporation Act, which states:
"Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally
liable by reason of his own acts or conduct." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(b) (Law. Co-op.
1990).
9. See SHERWOOD M. CLEVELAND ET AL., SOUTH CAROLINA CORPORATE PRACTICE

MANUAL § 37.06[3] (1989). But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
ShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (calling for reconsideration
of the doctrine of limited shareholder liability and arguing that shareholders should be personally
liable for tort claims against the corporation when corporate assets are'insufficient to satisfy those
claims.); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,91 COLuM. L. REV,
1565 (1991) (calling for similar reconsideration).
10. Costas v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 283 S.C. 94, 102, 321 S.E.2d 51, 56 (1984).
11. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER

BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 347 (3d ed. 1983).
12. See Carroll v. Smith-Henry, Inc., 281 S.C. 104, 106, 313 S.E.2d 649, 651 (Ct. App.
1984) (holding that a corporation is not liable for its subsidiary's acts whether the subsidiary is
wholly or partially owned).
13. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
14. See Leebron, supra note 9, at 1573.
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This rule of limited liability, however, does not immunize shareholders
from personal liability for torts in which they participate.' 5 Furthermore,
third persons may hold shareholders personally liable when they are parties to
or personal guarantors of contracts made on behalf of the corporation.' 6 The
courts will also "pierce the corporate veil" and impose personal liability on the
shareholders when the corporate form has been abused to defraud creditors or
treat them in an outrageously unfair manner.' 7 These cases typically involve
shareholders in a closely held corporation who manipulate the corporate entity
for personal gain. The manipulation is often manifested by gross corporate
undercapitalization and the disregard of corporate formalities.'" The corporate
veil is pierced when the corporation is no longer a bona fide independent
entity and when treating the corporation as a separate entity would justify a
wrong or protect a fraud. A judgment against an insolvent corporation that is
a mere shell is worthless if the shareholders, in whose hands the assets are
concentrated, are insulated from personal liability.
B. Director and Officer Liability
Like shareholders, directors and officers are generally not liable to a
corporation's creditors or to third persons for corporate acts or
debts.' 9 Directors and officers are merely agents of the corporation and are
protected from personal liability on corporate contracts if they do not purport
to bind themselves individually.2' In addition, a director or officer does not
incur personal liability for the corporation's torts merely because of his official
relationship to the corporation. 2'
A director or officer can be liable, however, on a written instrument
executed in a manner that makes him personally liable.' For example, a

15. CLEVELAND ET AL., supra note 9, § 37.06[1]; cf. Griffin v. Heinitsh, 309 F. Supp. 1028,
1033 (D.S.C. 1970) (holding that a shareholder is not liable in a fraud and deceit action when
he did not participate in alleged misconduct).
16. CLEVELAND ET AL., supra note 9, § 37.06[1].

17. Id. § 37.06[3].
18. See DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976);
Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (1984); Cumberland Wood Prods., Inc. v.
Bennett, 308 S.C. 268, 417 S.E.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1992); C.T. Lowndes & Co. v. Suburban Gas
& Appliance Co., 307 S.C. 394, 415 S.E.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1991).
19. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 330, 114 S.E.2d 321, 327
(1960); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 1829 (1985).
20. Green v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 199 S.C. 262, 270, 18 S.E.2d 873, 876-77
(1942); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§§ 1829-1841 (1985).
21. Olin Mathieson, 236 S.C. at 330, 114 S.E.2d at 326; 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations
§§ 1877-1891 (1985).
22. See Costas v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 283 S.C. 94, 102, 321 S.E.2d 51, 56 (1984)
("It is well settled that directors and officers are personally liable on written instruments signed
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corporate president who executes a contract on behalf of the corporation by
signing only his name with the affix "president" is personally liable on the
contract unless the whole instrument or parol evidence shows that it was
intended to be a contract by the corporation.2u
Furthermore, directors and officers are personally liable for their own
torts, whether committed in the course of the corporation's business or
not.24 A director or officer cannot escape liability on the ground that in
counitting the tort he acted as a director or officer of the corporation. Directors and officers are also personally liable for the acts of subordinates that they have ratified. In Hunt v. Rabones the South Carolina Supreme
Court summarized the standard governing the personal liability of a corporate
officer or director for the misconduct of corporate employees. "A director,
officer, or agent is not liable for torts of the corporation or of other officers
or agents merely because of his office. He is liable for torts in which he has
participated or which he has authorized or directed."26
III. SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LEGISLATION
REGULATING MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS

A. The UTPA
The South Carolina General Assembly, against the backdrop of the
burgeoning consumer protection movement of the 1960s and 1970s, enacted
the UTPA to protect innocent consumers from deceptive trade practices and
to eliminate unfair methods of competition between competing
businesses.27 Commentators often refer to the UTPA as the "Little FTC Act"

by them which are not so worded as to bind the corporation.") (citing 19 C.J.S. Corporations
§ 840 (1990)); Gregory B. Adams, Suing Corporationsand Those Behind Them, S.C. TRIAL
LAW. BULL. Summer 1992, at 17, 17 ("[Tlhere are many cases where carelessly signing a
corporate contract or note without indicating that the signature is solely on behalf [of] the
corporation in the signer's official capacity has resulted in personal liability.").
23. See, e.g., Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round Dev. Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 232
S.E.2d 20 (1977); J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clark, 87 S.C. 199, 69 S.E. 227 (1910).
24. Rice v. Baltz, No. 94-UP-020 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1994). For example, if the
presidentof a corporation negligently causes an automobile accident, his personal liability remains
the same whether he is driving a company car while on corporate business or driving his family
car while on vacation. CLEVELAND ET AL., supra note 9, § 37.04[2].
25. 275 S.C. 475, 272 S.E.2d 643 (1980).
26. Id. at 478, 272 S.E.2d at 644 (citation omitted); see also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding a corporate executive not
vicariously liable for the torts of his corporation merely by virtue of his office; personal liability
must be based on specific acts by the individual director or officer).
27. See Richard E. Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade PracticesAct: Sleeping Giant or
Illusive Panacea?,33 S.C. L. REV. 479, 479-83 (1982); N. Heyward Clarkson, III, Note,
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because of its similarity to the FTCA.2 In fact, the UTPA instructs South
Carolina courts, when construing section 39-5-20(a), to "be guided by" the
interpretations given by the federal courts and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to section 5 of the FTCA.29 This express adoption of the extensive
body of precedent existing under the FTCA was intended not only to benefit
the courts but also to guide businesses in determining what is an unfair or
deceptive trade practice.3"
Section 39-5-20(a) of the UTPA declares that "[u]nfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are ... unlawful."31 The South Carolina Court of

Appeals has defined an unfair trade practice as one that is "offensive to public
policy or ... immoral, unethical, or oppressive." 32 In addition, a practice
is deceptive if it merely has a tendency or capacity to deceive. 33 Neither
actual deception nor intent to deceive is needed to prove that a practice is
deceptive under the UTPA.34 Proof of common-law fraud is not required to
support a finding of deceptive conduct under the Act. 35
The UTPA provides for enforcement by the attorney general36 and, with
the attorney general's prior approval, by solicitors and county and city
attorneys.3 7 The Act permits the government to seek injunctions,3 8 civil

Consumer Protectionand the Proposed "South CarolinaUnfair Trade PracticesAct", 22 S.C.
L. REV. 767, 767-70 (1970). For a commentary examining the judicial development of the
UTPA, see Michael R. Smith, Note, Recent Developments Under the South Carolina Unfair
Trade PracticesAct, 44 S.C. L. REv. 543 (1993).
28. Albert L. Norton, Jr., The South Carolina UnfairTrade PracticesAct and the Void-forVagueness Doctrine, 40 S.C. L. Rv.641, 641 (1989); see Day, supra note 27, at 479-80;
Clarkson, supra note 27, at 780.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985). Section 5 of the FTCA prohibits
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).
30. Clarkson, supra note 27, at 782-83 n.86. But see Norton, supra note 28, at 663-66
(challenging the notion that the UTPA's reference to federal precedents provides adequate notice
to potential defendants regarding what conduct is unlawful).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
32. Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 326, 396 S.E.2d 105, 108 (Ct.
App. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 309 S.C. 263, 422 S.E.2d 103
(1992) (per curiam).
33. State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 285, 294 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1982) (citing
United States Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962)).
34. Id.
35. Inman v. Key Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 242, 363 S.E.2d 691, 692
(1988) (citing State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App.
1984)).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-50(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-130 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-50(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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penalties, 39 restitution for injured persons,4" and the dissolution, suspension,
or forfeiture of a corporate charter or franchise. 4' During these proceedings,
government attorneys can issue investigative demands and subpoenas to compel
the testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary and physical
evidence.4
The UTPA also grants a private right of action to "[a]ny person who
suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal," as the
result of a violation of section 39-5-20.13 Private plaintiffs may recover actual
damages and, in the case of willful violations, treble damages." "[A] willful
violation occurs when the party committing the violation knew or should have
known that his conduct was a violation of [the Act]. "' In addition, prevailing
plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and such other relief as the
court may deem "necessary and proper."46 Although a showing of willful
conduct in violation of section 39-5-20 is necessary to recover treble damages,
willfulness is not necessary to receive attorney's fees-merely finding a violation itself is sufficient.47
Public enforcement actions and private damages actions may be brought
against any person who uses or employs any method, act, or practice declared
unlawful under section 39-5-20. 48 The term "person" is broadly defined and
includes "natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or

39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-110 (Law. Co-op. 1985). In actions brought by the attorney
general, the state may recover civil penalties up to $5,000 for each willful violation of the Act
and up to $15,000 for violations of injunctions issued under the Act. Id.
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-50(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-70(a), -80 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
44. Id.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(d) (Law. Co-op. 1985). One commentator asserts that use
of the language "should have known" in the statutory definition of willful conduct suggests a
negligence standard. Smith, supra note 27, at 555; see State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc'y
Today, Inc., 290 S.C. 124, 128, 348 S.E.2d 381, 384 (Ct. App. 1986) ("The standard is not one
of actual knowledge, but of constructive knowledge. If, in the exercise ofdue diligence, a person
of ordinary prudence engaged in trade or commerce could have ascertained that his conduct
violates the Act, then such conduct is 'willful' within the meaning of the statute."); see also
Haley Nursery Co. v. Forrest, 298 S.C. 520, 525, 381 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1989) (quoting Nest
Egg). But cf. State ex rel. McLeod v. Whiteside, No. 79-CP-40-0671, slip op. at 18 (S.C. Ct.
C.P. Richland July 16, 1981) ("[W]illfulness [under the UTPA] implies the conscious or knowing
doing of an act and an absence of good faith.").
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985). See Freeman v. A. & M. Mobile
Home Sales, Inc., 293 S.C. 255, 265, 359 S.E.2d 532, 538-39 (Ct. App. 1987).
47. See Note, Recovery of Attorneys'Fees as Costs or Damages in South Carolina,38 S.C.
L. REV. 823, 855 (1987).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-50(a), -140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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unincorporated associations and any other legal entity. " " Thus any person
who violates the UTPA and causes another person an "ascertainable loss of
money or property" is subject to personal liability under the Act."
Although the statutory definition of person does not specifically refer to
officers, directors, or shareholders, in government enforcement actions South
Carolina courts have extended the definition to include controlling persons of
offending entities.51 As discussed below, it is unclear whether these cases
authorize the government to hold controlling persons liable even if they did not
participate in or ratify the UTPA violation. 2 However, the South Carolina
Supreme Court recently held that in private damages actions brought under the
UTPA, officeholding or shareholding alone is insufficient to confer controlling
person liability for corporate violations.53 In private damages actions, controlling persons must personally participate in or authorize the unlawful conduct
to be liable for a corporation's unfair trade practices.54
B. The MVUTPA
The language of the MVUTPA closely parallels that of the UTPA. ss Section 56-15-30(a) of the MVUTPA declares that "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices as defined in [section] 56-15-40

49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
51. See, e.g., State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc'y Today, Inc., 290 S.C. 124, 132, 348
S.E.2d 381, 385-86 (Ct. App. 1986); State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 53132, 313 S.E.2d 334, 341 (Ct. App. 1984); see also State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C.
281, 283-84, 294 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1982) (reversing summary judgment finding that the
defendant was not liable as a controlling person of the corporate defendant when evidence was
in dispute regarding whether the defendant owned stock and was actively involved in corporate
operations); cf. State ex rel. McLeod v. VIP Enter., Inc., 286 S.C. 501, 506, 335 S.E.2d 243,
246 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the defendants were not liable as controlling persons when the
"record [was] devoid of evidence these individuals either helped to formulate company policy
regarding the marketing scheme [that violated the UTPA] or were involved in important corporate
affairs." (citation omitted)). See generallySmith, supranote 27, at 549-50 (discussing the liability
of principals and corporate personnel).
52. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
53. Plowman v. Bagnal, _ S.C. _, 450 S.E.2d 36 (1994); see infra notes 108-20 and
accompanying text.
54. Id.
55. For commentary noting these parallels, see Nathan M. Crystal, Consumer Product
WarrantyLitigation in South Carolina,31 S.C. L. REv. 293, 352 (1980); Note, supra note 47,
at 859 & n.213. Although it clearly mirrors the UTPA and FTCA in several areas, the
MVUTPA's exact origin is unclear. One commentator suggests that the MVUTPA is based on
the Federal Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1994). Mark L. Richardson, Case Comment, Court Addresses the Regulation of Manufacturers,Distributors, and
DealersAct, 45 S.C. L. REv. 21, 23 (1993).
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unlawful."56 The Act makes it a violation of section 56-15-30(a) for

any "motor vehicle dealer to engage in any action which is arbitrary, in bad
faith, or unconscionable and which causes damage to any of the parties or to
the public." 57 The MVUTPA protects consumers from unfair and deceptive
trade practices in connection with the sale, rental, or lease of a new or used
motor vehicle.5 8 Like the UTPA, the MVUTPA expressly instructs South
Carolina courts to apply section 56-15-30(a) of the statute by reference to the
provisions of the FTCA.59
The MVUTPA, like the UTPA and FTCA, provides for cease and desist
orders and injunctive relief as remedial measures in actions brought by the
attorney general.' The MVUTPA further grants a private cause of action to
"any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden" by the Act. 6 Violations of section 56-15-30(a) carry
with them mandatory double damages and attorney's fees. 62 A private
plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant knowingly or wilfully
violated the MVUTPA. The plaintiff need only show that the defendant
engaged in conduct that violated the Act and that caused injury to the
plaintiff's business or property.' The court can also award treble damages

56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-30(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991). Unlike the UTPA, the MVUTPA
specifically enumerates unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or practices. The
inclusion of a comprehensive "catch-all" provision, however, makes it unlikely that an act which
would be an unfair trade practice under the UTPA would not also be actionable under the
MVUTPA. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-40(1)-(4) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-40(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991). The legislative findings state that
the MVUTPA's purpose is "to regulate motor vehicle ... dealers and their representatives doing
business in South Carolina in order to prevent frauds, impositions and other abuses upon its citizens." Act of May 22, 1972, No. 1237, § 1, 1972 S.C. Acts 2419, 2419.
58. See Southern Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. Hall, 306 S.C. 92, 94, 410 S.E.2d 577, 578 (Ct.
App. 1991). The MVUTPA excludes motorcycles from its coverage. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1510(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-30(b) (Law. Co-op. 1991). At least one commentator argues
that this parallel suggests that court decisions under § 39-5-20 of the UTPA should be highly
persuasive in interpreting liability under § 56-15-30 of the MVUTPA. Note, supra note 47, at
859 n.213.
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-40(5) (Law. Co-op. 1991). Unlike the UTPA, the MVUTPA
does not allow the government to seek civil penalties or restitution for persons injured by
violations of the Act. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-50(b), -110 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991). But see Richardson, supranote 55,
at 23-24 (challenging the assumption that the MVUTPA grants a private cause of action to
consumers).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (an injured plaintiff "shall recover
double the actual damages by him sustained." (emphasis added)); see also Riddle v. Pitts, 283
S.C. 387, 388, 324 S.E.2d 59, 59 (1984) ("Section 56-15-110... mandates double recovery
of actual damages and permits punitive damages up to three times actual damages .... " (emphasis added)).
63. Note, supra note 47, at 860. Although the appellate courts have not ruled on the issue,
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in the form of statutory punitive damages if the jury finds that the defendant
acted maliciously.64 Most importantly, damages may be "pyramided"-a
plaintiff can recover double damages and punitive damages up to three times
actual damages when malice is shown.'
A motor vehicle dealer is defined as "any person who sells or attempts to
effect the sale of any motor vehicle."' In an unexplained departure from the
UTPA, the MVUTPA expands the definition of a person to include:
A natural person, corporation, partnership, trust or other entity, and, in
case of an entity, it shall include any other entity in which it has a majority
interest or effectively controls as well as the individual officers, directors
and otherpersons in active control of the activities of each such entity.67
The MVUTPA definition is patently more inclusive than the UTPA def'mition65 and is therefore troublesome for the officers, directors, and controlling
shareholders of corporate dealerships.
Within its definition of a motor vehicle dealer, the MVUTPA arguably
encompasses four different categories of individuals and entities:

the MVUTPA apparently does not grant a private right of action for unfair trade practices that
cause only personal injuries. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-40(5) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (granting
private cause of action to any person "injured in his business orproperty" (emphasis added)); cf.
Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that personal injuries
are not compensable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
provision that grants a private cause of action to any person "injured in his business or property"
by conduct violating the Act); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., 888 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir. 1989)
(allowing no recovery for personal injuries under RICO).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991). Although the MVUTPA does not
define the malice requirement, a commentator has observed that this standard is higher than that
required by the UTPA. Note, supra note 47, at 860. In comparison, the UTPA allows punitive
damages for willful violations. A willful violation occurs "when the party committing the
violation knew or should have known that his conduct was a violation of [the UTPA]." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a), (d) (Law. Co-op. 1985). For a discussion of the willfulness requirement under the UTPA, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65. See Tousley v. North Am. Van Lines, 752 F.2d 96, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1985); Columbia
Teachers Fed. Credit Union v. Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 303 S.C. 162, 167, 399 S.E.2d
444, 447 (Ct. App. 1990).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-10(h) (Law. Co-op. 1991). The MVUTPA expressly exempts
from the definition of a motor vehicle dealer public officers selling vehicles as part of their official duties, persons disposing of vehicles acquired for their personal use, and finance companies
selling repossessed vehicles. Id.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-10(n) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (emphasis added).
68. In contrast, the UTPA defines person to include "natural persons, corporations, trusts,
partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations and any other legal entity." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-5-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985). The UTPA definition does not expressly include the
officers, directors, and other persons who are in active control of legal entities.
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(1) Any natural person, corporation, partnership, trust, or other entity
which sells or attempts to effect the sale of any motor vehicle.
Example. A sole proprietor in the automobile sales business or an
incorporated automobile dealership.
(2) In the case of an "entity" which sells or attempts to effect the sale of
any motor vehicle, any other entity in which the first entity has a
majority interest or effective control.

Example. The wholly-owned subsidiary of an incorporated automobile
dealership.
(3) In the case of an "entity" which sells or attempts to effect the sale of
any motor vehicle, the officers, directors, and other persons in active
control of the activities of that entity.
Example. The president of an incorporated automobile dealership.
(4) In the case of an "entity" which sells or attempts to effect the sale of
any motor vehicle, the officers, directors, and other persons in active
control of the activities of any other entity in which the first entity has
a majority interest or effective control.
Example. The president of a wholly-owned subsidiary of an incorporated automobile dealership.
The MVUTPA's definition of a motor vehicle dealer clearly includes the
individuals and entities identified in subdivisions (1) and (2). Whether the
definition also includes the individuals identified in subdivisions (3) and (4)
depends on one's interpretation of the phrase "each such entity." Section 5615-10(n) states that the term person means a legal entity itself plus any other
entity that it effectively controls as well as the officers, directors, and other
persons in control of "each such entity. "69 The statute's use of the word
"such" creates the difficulty in ascertaining whether the drafters intended a
motor vehicle dealer to include the individuals identified in subdivisions
(3), (4), or both.7' The word such refers to some entity previously mentioned
in the sentence. The critical question then becomes: To which beforementioned entity (or entities) does the phrase "each such entity" refer? Three
interpretations can be employed to answer this question.
Under the first interpretation, the phrase "each such entity" refers only
to the entity that is effectively controlled by the entity selling motor vehicles

69. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 56-15-10(n) (Law. Co-op. 1991).

70.
As an adjective, such can be used to mean of this or that kind, character, or
degree.... Avoid using such as an adjective meaning before-mentioned to avoid
repeating a word or phrase. When such is used in this way, replace it with that, this,
these, those, its, or the.
Avoid using such as a pronoun. When such appears as a pronoun, replace it with
a noun or another pronoun.
TEXAs LAW REvmw, MANUAL ON STYLE § 2:17:59 (7th ed. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
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or in which the entity selling motor vehicles has a majority interest. This
interpretation, therefore, omits the individuals identified in subdivision
(3) from the definition of a motor vehicle dealer because these individuals fail
to qualify as officers, directors, or persons who control an entity that is
effectively controlled by an entity selling motor vehicles. This interpretation
would include, however, the individuals identified in subdivision (4).
Under the second interpretation, the phrase "each such entity" refers only
to the entity that is selling the motor vehicles. This interpretation includes the
individuals identified in subdivision (3) because they qualify as officers,
directors, or persons in control of an entity that sells motor vehicles. However, individuals identified in subdivision (4) are excluded from the
definition of a motor vehicle dealer.
Under the third interpretation, the phrase "each such entity" refers not
only to the entity that is effectively controlled by the entity selling motor
vehicles or in which the entity selling motor vehicles has a majority interest,
but also to the entity that is selling the motor vehicles. Accordingly, the third
interpretation would include the individuals identified in subdivision (3)
because they are officers, directors, or persons in control of an entity that sells
motor vehicles. This interpretation also encompasses the individuals identified
in subdivision (4) because they are officers, directors, or persons in control of
an entity that is effectively controlled by an entity selling motor vehicles or in
which the entity selling motor vehicles has a majority interest.
The second interpretation appears to be the most logical and reasonable
of the three alternatives. Adopting the first interpretation would create the
anomalous result in which the officers, directors, and persons in control of a
dealership would not be included in the definition of a motor vehicle dealer,
but the officers, directors, and persons in control of a subsidiary of the
dealership would be included. It would contradict logical reasoning to define
a motor vehicle dealer to include the persons in control of a subsidiary of a
dealership but to exclude the persons in control of the dealership itself.71
The third interpretation should not be followed because it disregards the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the definition. A principle of
construction requires that statutory language must be given its plain and
ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or
expand the statute's operation.7" Applying this principle to the MVUTPA, the

71. See United States v. Rippetoe, 178 F.2d 735,737 (4th Cir. 1949) (requiring that whenever
a reasonable application can be given consistent with the legislative purpose, courts should give
all laws a "sensible construction" and avoid "literal applications of language which leads to
absurd consequences"); Stephens v. Hendricks, 226 S.C. 79, 93, 83 S.E.2d 634, 641 (1954)
(holding that courts will not give a construction to a statute which would make its application
unreasonable and absurd).
72. See Adkins v. Varn, 312 S.C. 188, 191, 439 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1993); Bryant v. City of
Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 411, 368 S.E.2d 899, 900-01 (1984); see also Poole v. Saxon Mills,
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ordinary meaning of the phrase "each such entity" is grammatically singular. The phrase refers to only one entity: either the entity selling motor
vehicles or the entity that is effectively controlled by the entity selling motor
vehicles. Only a forced construction can expand the meaning of the phrase to
encompass both the entity selling motor vehicles and the entity which is
effectively controlled by the entity selling motor vehicles. Such a construction
would effectively rewrite the phrase "each such entity" to mean both such
entities.
Consequently, the second interpretation is the most reasonable of the three
alternatives because (1) it leads to the most sensible result and (2) it gives the
phrase its plain and ordinary meaning. Under this interpretation, the MVUTPA
definition of the term "person" would effectively read as follows:
"Person," a natural person, corporation, partnership, trust or other entity,
and, in the case of [a corporation, partnership, trust or other entity], it
shall include [i]
any other entity in which [the corporation, partnership,
trust or entity] has a majority interest or effectively controls as well as [ii]
the individual officers, directors and other persons in active control of the
activities of [the corporation, partnership, trust or entity].
The South Carolina Supreme Court's recent decision in Toyota of Florence, Inc. v. Lynch, 3 which is the first reported appellate court opinion to
discuss the MVUTPA's definition of the term person, fails to provide any
insight regarding which of the three interpretations the courts will adopt. The
Lynch decision, however, does indicate that a corporate holding company fails
to qualify as an "officer, director, or person in active control" of a motor
vehicle distributor within the meaning of the MVUTPA.
In Lynch, the plaintiff obtained substantial jury verdicts under the MVUTPA against Southeast Toyota Distributors (SET), a motor vehicle distributor,
and JM Family Enterprises (JM), a holding company that was the sole shareholder of SET.74 The MVUTPA defines a distributor as "any person who
sells or distributes new motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers. "I Like the
definition of the term dealer, the definition of a distributor incorporates the
MVUTPA's definition of the term person. Therefore, under the same
reasoning applied to the definition of a dealer, the MVUTPA arguably includes
four different subdivisions of individuals and entities within its definition of

192 S.C. 339, 347, 6 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1940) (holding that statutory "phrases and sentences are
to be construed according to the rules of grammar").
73. __ S.C. _, 442 S.E.2d 611 (1994).
74. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 614. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $5 million and
punitive damages of $3.5 million. The trial judge remitted the compensatory damages to
$4,525,232 and then doubled them to $9,050,464 as required under Act.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-10(g) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (emphasis added).
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a distributor. 6 Under a subdivision (3) situation, the officers, directors, and
other persons in active control of SET (an incorporated "distributor") could
be held liable for SET's violations of the MVUTPA. Because JM owned all

of SET's stock, an argument could be made that JM qualified as a person in
active control of SET's activities within the meaning of the MVUTPA.

The supreme court, however, reversed the jury verdict against JM and
ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff could not hold JM liable under the

MVUTPA." The court disposed of the issue in a rather summary fashion."8
The entire text of the court's opinion relating to JM's liability under the

MVUTPA provides as follows:
The jury returned a verdict for [the plaintiff] under the [MVUTPA]
against both [SET] and JM. JM contends this verdict against it should be
set aside because it is not one of the entities which can incur liability under
the Act. We agree.
[The plaintiff] alleged damages as the result of violations of S.C.Code
Ann. [section] 56-15-40 (1991). This statute makes it unlawful for a manu-

facturer, factory branch or division, factory representative, distributor,
wholesaler, distributor branch or division, distributor representative, motor
vehicle dealer, or wholesale branch or division, to engage in certain
conduct. Id. These terms are defined in S.C.Code Ann. [section] 56-15-10

(1991). While [SET] is both a distributor and a franchisor under the Act,
[section] 56-15-10(g) and (j) (1991), there is no provision making the
owner ofsuch an entity liable. Cf., [section]56-15-10(n) (iability extended
to an entity in which [SET] has a majority interest or effectively controls). The judgment against JM under the Act shall be set aside. 9

76. In the case of distributors, these subdivisions would include the following:
(1) Any natural person, corporation, partnership, trust, or other entity which sells or
distributes new motor vehicles to dealers;
(2) In the case of an "entity" which sells or distributes new motor vehicles to dealers,
any other entity in which that entity has a majority interest or effective control;
(3) In the case of an "entity" which sells or distributes new motor vehicles to dealers,
the officers, directors, and other persons in active control of the activities of that
entity; and
(4) In the case of an "entity" which sells or distributes new motor vehicles to dealers,
the officers, directors, and other persons in active control of the activities of any
other entity in which that entity has a majority interest or effective control.
77. Lynch, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 615-16.
78. The court's brevity may be explained by the fact that neither litigant briefed the issue of
JM's liability in any significant detail. Although the appellants and respondents submitted briefs
at least 90 pages in length, neither side devoted more than two pages to the issue of controlling
persons. See Initial Brief of Appellants at 65-66; Brief of Respondents at 86.
79. Lynch, _ S.C. at_, 442 S.E.2d at 615-16 (emphasis added).
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The court clearly based its holding on that portion of the MVUTPA's
definition of the term person which expressly includes a "natural person,
corporation, partnership, trust or other entity, and, in case of an entity, it shall
include any other entity in which it has a majority interest or effectively controls."80 In other words, the court focused on a subdivision (2) situation as
discussed above. Because SET did not have a majority interest in or effectively
control JM the court correctly held that JM could not be held liable under that
portion of the definition.
Unfortunately, the supreme court did not further expound upon the scope
of the MVUTPA's definition of a person in rendering its decision. Noticeably
absent from the court's opinion is any discussion of the remaining portion of
the definition--the language referring to the "officers, directors and other
persons in active control" of a legal entity. Even though SET did not have a
majority interest in or effectively control JM, JM was SET's sole shareholder
and conceivably could be held liable to the plaintiff under a subdivision (3)
situation. Under this scenario, the plaintiff could sue SET, an entity which
sells or distributes new motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers, as well as JM,
the officer, director, or "person" in active control of SET.
Despite the existence of the "officers, directors, and other persons in
active control" language in the MVUTPA, the supreme court specifically
stated that "there is no provision [in the Act] making the owner of" a
distributor liable.' If applied literally, this statement could mandate a
wholesale rejection of the imposition of liability based on either a subdivision
(3) or (4) situation discussed above. It is unlikely, however, that the court
intended its holding to be so sweeping. The importance of the Lynch holding
most likely is that sole shareholder status alone is insufficient to impose
controlling person liability under the MVUTPA. In other words, if the sole
shareholder of a corporation is not also a corporate officer or director and
does not otherwise actively control or manage the daily activities of the
corporation, then it is inappropriate to impose controlling person liability upon
the shareholder under the MVUTPA. The apparent conclusion of the supreme
court is that JM confined its activities merely to owning SET's stock and did
not control or manage SET's business activities.' The court's decision in

80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-10(n) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (emphasis added).
81. Lynch, - S.C. at_, 442 S.E.2d at 616.
82. It is unclear from the record in Lynch whether JM was in fact more than a mere holding
company for SET. Compare Initial Brief of Appellants at 65 ("[JM], the record shows without
dispute, is simply a Florida holding company that owns the stock of SET and several other
operating corporations.. . . [JM] does not conduct any operations itself.... There was no
evidence that [JM] did anything except own the stock of SET.") with Brief of Respondents at 86
("[JM] was not simply a stockholder of SET; [JM] was the managing agent of SET. [JM] bills
SET for management services provided to SET by employees of [JM].").
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Lynch, therefore, effectively immunizes certain passive investors from
controlling person liability under the MVUTPA.
In Rowe v. Hyatt, 3 the second and most recent appellate court opinion
to discuss the MVUTPA's definition of a person, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals conclusively determined that a person includes the individuals identified in a subdivision (3) situation. In Rowe the president, director, and sole
shareholder of a motor vehicle dealership was held personally liable for a
salesman's violation of the MVUTPA even though he did not know of or
participate in the salesman's misconduct." The result in Rowe necessarily
rejects the first interpretation of the phrase "each such entity" as previously
discussed. However, the opinion still leaves unresolved which of the remaining
two interpretations the courts will follow.'
The facts in Rowe are straightforward. Ken Hyatt was the sole shareholder, president, and director of Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (Imperial), an
incorporated automobile dealership. 6 The plaintiffs, Roger and Mitchalene
Rowe, relied on a dealership salesman's representations when they purchased
an automobile from Imperial. s7 The salesman violated the MVUTPA by
misrepresenting the automobile to be a 1987 demonstrator vehicle when in fact
it was a 1986 model purchased from a rental fleet."8 Although Hyatt
exercised significant control over Imperial's operations, he never had any
contact with the Rowes and was not involved in the sale of the automobile at
issue.8 9 The evidence disclosed that Hyatt did not personally participate in,
know of, or approve of the salesman's unlawful conduct.
Despite Hyatt's lack of participation in or knowledge of the salesman's
misconduct, the court of appeals held that the Rowes could maintain a cause
of action under the MVUTPA against Hyatt in his individual capacity based
on the salesman's violation of the Act."° The court distinguished the South
Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Plowman v. Bagnal,9 ' which had been
decided only six months earlier. The Plowman court had held that "in private
actions under the UTPA, directors and officers are not liable for the
corporation's unfair trade practices unless they personally commit, participate

83. _ S.C. _,
452 S.E.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1994).
84. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 359.
85. For example, Rowe did not address whether a sole shareholder, president, and director
of a subsidiary of an automobile dealership-a subdivision (4) situation-can be held personally
liable for the dealership's violation of the MVUTPA.
86. Rowe, _ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 356.
87. Id.
88. Id. at
, 452 S.E.2d at 357.
89. Id.
90. Id. at _,452 S.E.2d at 359.
91. _ S.C. _,
450 S.E.2d 36 (1994).
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in, direct, or authorize the commission of a violation of the UTPA."2 The
court of appeals distinguished the Plowman holding based on the significant
difference in definitions of the term "person" found in the UTPA and
MVUTPA.9 The court held that by including officers, directors, and other
controlling persons of a corporate defendant in the MVUTPA definition, the
legislature expressly provided for controlling person liability under the
94
MVUTPA.
The Rowe court also stated that the MVUTPA goes further than the
UTPA and allows a private plaintiff to hold the officers, directors, and control
persons of a motor vehicle dealership personally liable based on the dealership's violation of the Act-even when the individual was unaware of and did not
participate in the unlawful conduct. Consequently, for every potential MVUTPA violation by an employee or subordinate, the dealership not only risks
liability as principal, but the officers, directors, and other control persons risk
personal liability as well.
IV. CONTROLLING PERSON LIABILITY UNDER THE UTPA
AND THE

FTCA

A. JudicialRecognition andDevelopment
of the Controlling PersonDoctrine Under the UTPA
1. Government Enforcement Actions
Although the UTPA definition of the term "person" is less inclusive than
the definition contained in the MVUTPA, South Carolina courts, in the context
of government enforcement actions, have extended the UTPA definition to
include the controlling persons of corporate defendants. In State ex rel.
McLeod v. C & L Corp.,95 South Carolina's landmark controlling person
doctrine case, the court of appeals invoked the doctrine to hold that the
attorney general could bring suit for injunctive relief or civil penalties against
controlling persons for corporate violations of the UTPA. A controlling person
under the UTPA is judicially defined as "one who formulates and directs
corporate policy or who is deeply involved in the important business affairs
of the corporation."96

92. Id. at
, 450 S.E.2d at 38 (citations omitted).
93. Rowe,_ S.C. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 358.
94. Id. at _, 452 S.E.2d at 358-59.
95. 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984). For commentary on this case, see Lisa
D. Hyman, Case Comment, FraudandLiabilityUnder the South CarolinaUnfairTradePractices
Act, 37 S.C. L. REv. 40 (1985).
96. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. at 531, 313 S.E.2d at 341 (citations omitted); see also State ex
rel. McLeod v. VIP Enter., Inc., 286 S.C. 501, 506, 335 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Ct. App. 1985)
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In C & L Corp., L.G. Funderburk (Funderburk) and W.L. Cooper, Jr.
(W.L. Cooper), officers and sole shareholders of C & L Corp., Inc. (C & L),
formed C & L to develop and sell a real estate subdivision. C & L contracted
with Wayne Cooper, W.L. Cooper's brother, to plan the subdivision, sell the
lots by installment-purchase contracts, and make all collections on the installment contracts for a commission. Sales agents hired by Wayne Cooper
engaged in deceptive and unfair trade practices to induce purchases of the
subdivision lots.
The attorney general initiated an action under the UTPA against C & L
as the corporation, Funderburk and W.L. Cooper as its officers, and Wayne
Cooper as C & L's alleged agent. The special referee granted summary judgment to Funderburk and W.L. Cooper. The court of appeals overturned the
summary judgment order and remanded for trial the issue of whether Funderburk and W.L. Cooper were controlling persons of C & L.
In reversing the special referee, the court of appeals held that the UTPA
authorizes the attorney general to hold both a corporation and its controlling
persons liable for a corporate violation of the Act.' The court cited a string
of federal cases interpreting the FTCA as authority for the court's rule of
law.98 Applying this rule to the facts before it, the court found that the status
of Funderburk and W.L. Cooper as officers and sole shareholders of C & L
"alone [was] sufficient to create a reasonable inference that they were controlling persons. "" If the attorney general proved that Funderburk and W.L.
Cooper were controlling persons of C & L, then they would be personally
liable for C & L's violation of the UTPA. The court of appeals upheld the
special referee's finding that Wayne Cooper and his salesmen were "agents"
of C & L and that their actions bound the corporation as principal. " Thus,
the sole question to be decided on remand was whether Funderburk and W.L.
Cooper were controlling persons of C & L. If so, they would be personally
liable for the actions of Wayne Cooper and the salesmen.
C & L Corp. makes clear that the legal consequence of being a controlling
person of an offending corporation is similar to that of a shareholder or officer
when the court pierces the corporate veil. The legal fiction that treats a
corporation as separate and distinct from its officers and shareholders is
effectively disregarded. A controlling person becomes the alter ego of the

(quoting C & L Corp.).
97. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. at 530, 313 S.E.2d at 341.
98. Id. (citing FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); SunshineArt Studios, Inc.
v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir. 1973); Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir.
1965); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912
(1953)). See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the controlling person
doctrine under the FTCA.
99. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. at 531, 313 S.E.2d at 341.
100. Id. at 528, 313 S.E.2d at 339-40.
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corporation. As a result, agency law subjects a controlling person to personal
liability as a principal for the misconduct of a corporate agent acting within the
scope of his agency, regardless of whether the controlling person authorized,
participated in, or knew of the misconduct.''
C & L Corp., however, fails to clarify whether a showing of culpable
conduct is completely unnecessary to establish controlling person liability. A
complete understanding of the specific circumstances under which an officer,
director, or controlling shareholder will be deemed a controlling person is
crucial. Unfortunately, the court in C & L Corp. did not delineate under what
circumstances an officer, director, or shareholder would be considered a
controlling person. But the court did implicitly decline to hold that the
individual defendants' status as sole shareholders and officers of C & L per se
made them liable as controlling persons.'" Instead, the court held that this
status created an "inference," which presumably could be rebutted on remand.' 03 Because there is no reported decision following remand, it is uncertain exactly what types of evidentiary facts are sufficient or necessary to rebut
the inference created by majority stock ownership and corporate officeholding.
In State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg Society Today, Inc. , o the officers,
directors, and shareholders of the corporate defendant appealed the lower
court's assessment of civil penalties against them in their individual capacities. The court of appeals responded to the individuals' claims that they were
not liable as controlling persons as follows:
[The individual defendants] contend the State produced no evidence that
they, individually, conducted any activities on behalf of the corporation in
South Carolina.
The argument is without merit. [They] admittedly are officers,
directors, and principal shareholders of the corporation. They admittedly
make policy and management decisions for the corporation. They were
admittedly personally involved in formulating the membership program

101. Id. at 528, 313 S.E.2d at 340 (citing Williams v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 159
S.C. 301, 156 S.E. 871 (1931); Reynolds v. Witte, 13 S.C. 5 (1879)). In West v. Service Life
& Health Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 198, 66 S.E.2d 816 (1951), the South Carolina Supreme Court
stated:
[A principal] is held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, deceits,
concealments, misrepresentations, negligences, and other malfeasances and omissions
of duty of his agent in the course of [the agent's] employment, although the principal
did not authorize or justify or participate in, or indeed, know of such misconduct, or
even if he forbade the acts or disapproved of them.
Id. at 202, 66 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting Huestess v. South At. Life Ins. Co., 88 S.C. 31, 41, 70
S.E. 403, 407 (1911)).
102. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. at 531, 313 S.E.2d at 341.

103. Id.
104. 290 S.C. 124, 348 S.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1986).
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which violates [the UTPA]. Since they are both persons who formulate and
direct corporate policy and are deeply involved in the important business
affairs of [the corporation], they are controlling persons of the corporation.'OS
The precise meaning of this holding is unclear. Although the appellate
court apparently concluded that the individuals were liable as controlling
persons because they "formulate[d] and direct[ed] corporate policy and [were]
deeply involved in the important business affairs of [the corporation,]" there
was also evidence in the record indicating that they were "personally
involved" in the very conduct violating the Act."° Consequently, Nest Egg
Society could be interpreted as tacitly recognizing a culpability requirement. On the other hand, it could be argued that any person who formulates
and directs corporate policy or who is deeply involved in the corporation's
important business affairs will be liable as a controlling person, regardless of
whether the person participated in or knew of the particular trade practice in
question.
Thus, in government enforcement actions under the UTPA, South Carolina decisions seem to require something more than mere status as an officer,
director, or majority shareholder to impose personal liability for a corporate
violation of the Act. However, it is still open to debate whether liability is
restricted to situations in which the individual knew of and participated in the
illegal conduct. 7
2. PrivateDamages Actions
In Plowman v. Bagnal,0 s the South Carolina Supreme Court, by a
narrow 3-2 majority, recently settled the question of controlling person liability
in the context of a private damages action under the UTPA. The court ruled
that a private litigant cannot hold the controlling persons of a corporate defendant personally liable for a corporate violation of the UTPA merely because

105. Id. at 132, 348 S.E.2d at 385-86 (emphasis added).

106. Id.
107. Compare Adams, supra note 22, at 17 ("[lPersonal liability [of shareholders, directors,
and officers] may result from participationin violations of statutory requirements found in many
state and federal laws, ranging from the Internal Revenue Code to federal and state securities laws
to unfair trade practices acts to environmental laws." (emphasis added)) with CLEVELAND ET AL.,
supra note 9, § 37.04[l] ("[U]nder the securities laws and unfair trade practices acts, liability
may be imposed upon shareholders, directors, or officers who are 'controlling persons' even
though they do not personallyparticipatein the conduct giving rise to the liability." (emphasis
added)).
108. __ S.C. _,
450 S.E.2d 36 (1994). For commentary on this case, see Cynthia A.
Smith, Case Comment, "ControllingPerson" Doctrine Not Applicable to PrivateActions Under
South Carolina Unfair Trade PracticeAct, 47 S.C. L. REV. 23 (1995).
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of their relationship to the corporate defendant. 3 9 An individual's status as
an officer, director, or person in control of the affairs of a corporation is
insufficient by itself to warrant controlling person liability in a private damages
action under the UTPA."' The Plowman majority further enunciated the
legal standard for holding controlling persons individually liable in a private
damages action under the UTPA. The court held that "in private actions under
the UTPA, directors and officers are not liable for the corporation's unfair
trade practices unless they personally commit, participate in, direct, or
authorize the commission of a violation of the UTPA.""'
The Plowman majority gave three reasons in support of its recognition of
a culpability requirement. First, the court focused on the language of the
UTPA's enforcement provision. Specifically, the court reasoned that because
section 39-5-140 of the UTPA speaks of the "use or employment by [a] person"112 of an unfair trade practice to impose liability, holding a person liable
solely because of their relationship to a corporate defendant would contravene
this requirement and impose liability "without regard to whether that person
'used or employed' an unfair trade practice."' Second, the majority
analogized to the standard applicable to tort actions. The court pointed out that
in tort actions, a director or officer of a corporation is not liable for the torts
of the corporation or of other officers or agents merely by holding office, but
is liable for the torts in which the director or officer participated or authorized." 4 Finally, the court pointed out that when the legislature "has seen
fit to take the unusual step of providing for control person liability, it has done

109. Plowman, _ S.C. at_, 450 S.E.2d at 37-38.
110. See also Rowe v. Hyatt, _ S.C. __, _, 452 S.E.2d 356, 357-58 (Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming a directed verdict in favor of the defendant in a private action brought against the sole
shareholder, president, and director of a dealership).
111. Plowman, _ S.C. at__, 450 S.E.2d at 38 (emphasis added). As support for this
standard of liability, the court cited several decisions from other jurisdictions holding corporate
officers and directors personally liable under state unfair trade practice statutes when they actually
participated in the unlawful conduct. Id. (citing Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602
(3rd Cir. 1978); Eastern Star, Inc. v. Union Bldg. Materials Corp., 712 P.2d 1148 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1985); Moy v. Schreiber Deed Sec. Co., 535 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Great Am.
Homebuilders, Inc. v. Gerhart, 708 S.W.2d 8 ('rex. Ct. App. 1986); Grayson v. Nordic Constr.
Co., 599 P.2d 1271 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (en bane)).
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
113. Plowman, __ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 37.
114. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 37-38 (citing Hunt v. Rabon, 275 S.C. 475, 272 S.E.2d 643
(1980)).
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so explicitly. " 5 The court concluded that the UTPA did not explicitly
provide for controlling person liability under the circumstances." 6
The Plowman majority also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that its
holding was inconsistent with previous controlling person decisions which
arose in the context of government enforcement actions under the UTPA. 117
The dissent found the plaintiffs' argument persuasive."' Indeed, if in
interpreting and applying previous government enforcement precedents under
the UTPA, the courts do not require more than mere officer, director, or
shareholder status to impose personal liability for a corporate violation of the
Act,

then the

Plowman decision

is

inconsistent

with those

hold-

ings." 9 Nevertheless, the Plowman majority pointed out that a different
standard is appropriate in private damages actions versus government enforcement actions. '20

As support for applying a different standard in private damages actions,
the majority cited Federal District Court Judge Falcon B. Hawkins' opinion
in Smith v. Burdette Chrysler Dodge Corp.'2' Judge Hawkins' decision in
Smith is the first reported opinion by a South Carolina court addressing the
issue of controlling person liability in a private damages action under the
UTPA. Judge Hawkins ultimately declined to rule on the issue based on
jurisdictional grounds. Although the opinion did not rule on the merits of the
controlling person issue, it nevertheless outlined several of the arguments

115. Id. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38 n.1 (citing the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, S.C.
§ 35-1-1500 (Law. Co-op. 1987), which provides that "[e]very person who directly
or indirectly controls a seller liable under § 35-1-1490, every partner, officer or director of such
a seller, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions,. . . are also
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller."); see also Rowe v. Hyatt,
_, 452 S.E.2d 356, 358-59 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the legislature
__ S.C. __,
expressly provided for controlling person liability under the MVUTPA by enacting a more
expansive definition of the term "person," which includes the officers, directors, and other
persons in active control of the activities of a corporate defendant).
116. Plowman,__ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38.
117. Id.
118. See id. at __, 450 S.E.2d at 40 (Toal, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's ruling
causes controlling person liability to mean one thing for private damages actions and another for
government enforcement actions).
119. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Plowman addressed whether the previous
government enforcement cases under the UTPA do in fact require something more than mere
officer, director, or shareholder status to impose controlling person liability for a corporate
violation of the Act. An argument can be made that, even in the context of government
enforcement, liability is restricted to situations in which the individual knew of and participated
in the illegal conduct. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text. If culpability is required
to impose controlling person liability in government enforcement actions under the UTPA, the
previous precedents are reconcilable with the majority opinion in Plowman.
120. Plowman, _ S.C. at _, 450 S.E.2d at 38.
121. 774 F. Supp. 380 (D.S.C. 1991).
CODE ANN.
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against the imposition of controlling person liability in a private damages
action under the UTPA when such liability is based solely on an individual's
status as an officer, director, or person in control of a legal entity.
The facts in Smith closely parallel those present in Rowe v. Hyatt. 2 In
Smith, Jo Smith purchased a motor vehicle from an automobile dealership and
brought suit against the dealership and Wayne Burdette, the dealership's
owner, under the UTPA based on allegations that the dealership misrepresented the vehicle's mileage." Smith admitted during his deposition that he
never had any direct contact with Burdette and it was undisputed that Burdette
had no personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. 2 4 Burdette moved
for summary judgment as to the claims against him on the basis that there was
no evidence of any wrongdoing on his part individually.
In opposing the summary judgment motion, Smith argued that the
controlling person doctrine, as espoused in State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L
Corp., 1 5 supported imposition of personal liability on Burdette. 26 Smith
asserted that Burdette was individually liable by virtue of his status as an
officer, director, and majority shareholder of the dealership. Although jurisdictional constraints prohibited Judge Hawkins from deciding the controlling
person issue, his opinion suggests that he would not have imposed personal
liability on Burdette based on the facts before him.
Judge Hawkins acknowledged that "South Carolina courts [had] not
touched upon the precise question raised which is whether Burdette, as a
controlling person, is liable [under the UTPA] to [Smith] for damages simply
as a result of the Dealership's violation of the statute."' 27 He also noted that
the South Carolina Court of Appeals's decision in C & L Corp.," as well
as the controlling person cases decided under the FTCA, all arose in the
context of government suits for civil penalties or injunctive relief.2 9 Thus,
there was no precedent in South Carolina law for applying the controlling
person doctrine to a private action for monetary damages. In addition, Judge
Hawkins observed that holding officers, directors, and shareholders individually liable for corporate violations of the UTPA, without more, contravenes the
protections of the corporate veil and limited shareholder liability. ' Indeed,

122. __ S.C. _, 452 S.E.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1994). For a discussion of Rowe, see supra
notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
123. Smith, 774 F. Supp. at 381.
124. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3.
125. 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984). See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
126. Smith, 774 F. Supp. at 383.
127. Id. at 382.
128. 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984).
129. Smith, 774 F. Supp. at 383.
130. Id.
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it seems unlikely that in passing legislation regulating unfair trade practices,
the South Carolina General Assembly intended to abrogate entrenched
doctrines in corporation and tort law.
Judge Hawkins also pointed out that the court of appeals in C & L Corp.
relied heavily on a string of federal cases decided under the FTCA as its
authority for allowing the attorney general to hold controlling persons individually liable for corporate violations of the UTPA."' As will be discussed in
more detail below,"' to impose controlling person liability under the FTCA,
the Federal Trade Commission must demonstrate that the individual defendant
knew of and participated in the unfair or deceptive conduct to warrant controlling person liability. 33 Thus, even if the controlling person doctrine of the
federal cases was applied to a private damages action, officeholder or shareholder status by itself would not warrant individual liability.
Finally, in discussing the FTCA decisions, Judge Hawkins touched upon
the rationale for imposing controlling person liability.'34 In the context of
government enforcement of the unfair trade practices legislation, the primary
purpose behind naming the officers, directors, and shareholders of a
corporation in a cease and desist or injunctive order is not to punish them for
a past violation of the law, but to prevent them from evading the order outside
of the corporate structure.'35 Officers, directors, and shareholders possess
the power to dissolve a corporation against which a cease and desist or
injunctive order has been directed and, therefore, are capable of continuing the
unlawful practices in the future by reorganizing the corporation under a
different name. Accordingly, courts include officers, directors, and shareholders in a cease and desist or injunctive order to curtail recurring or future
violations of the law, not to remedy past misconduct. In comparison, the
primary objective of a private damages action is to compensate a particular
victim of past misconduct, not necessarily to prevent or enjoin future
violations of the law.

131. Id.
132. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
133. Smith, 774 F. Supp. at 383.
134. Id.
135. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) ("Orders of the Federal Trade
Commission are not intended to impose criminal punishment or exact compensatory damages for
past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future."); Coro, Inc. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 149, 153
(ist Cir. 1964) ("The [FTC] . . . is not empowered to issue a cease and desist order as
punishment for past offenses. It has power only to put a stop to present unlawful practices and
to prevent their recurrence in the future.") (citing New Standard Publishing Co. v. FTC, 194
F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1952)); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963) ("The
purpose of the [FTCA] is to protect the public, not to punish a wrongdoer.") (citing Gimbel Bros.
v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941)).
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B. The ControllingPerson Doctrine
Under the FTCA
1. The Doctrine'sPurpose
The South Carolina Court of Appeals in State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L
Corp."'3 looked to federal court decisions interpreting the FTCA for authority in extending liability under the UTPA to controlling persons of corporate
defendants. The controlling person doctrine initially developed in cases arising
under federal law. Numerous courts have applied the doctrine in government
enforcement actions brought under the FTCA, which gives the FTC power to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations from using unfair methods of
competition or unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce. t37
The FTCA decisions applying the controlling person doctrine demonstrate
that the doctrine's primary purpose is to prevent the evasion of cease and
desist orders issued by the FTC and to punish those who knowingly violate
those orders.13 As pointed out above, if the controlling persons of a
corporation could not be enjoined as individuals, they could simply dissolve
the corporation against which the order was directed, reorganize under another
name, and thereby continue the very practices sought to be enjoined. Likewise,
if civil penalties could not be imposed upon controlling persons for a knowing
violation of a cease and desist order,139 no incentive would exist to refrain

136. 280 S.C. 519, 530-31, 313 S.E.2d 334, 341 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing FTC v. Standard
Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937); Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir.
1973); Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939
(1966); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912
(1953)).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1994). A private cause of action is unavailable under the FTCA. See
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co.,
483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 449 F. Supp. 132 (D.S.C.
1976), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1978).
138. See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 119 (1937) ("Since circumstances ... are such that further efforts of these individual respondents to evade orders of the [FTC]
might be anticipated, it was proper for the [FTC] to include them in its cease and desist order.");
Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 324 (8th Cir. 1965) ("Once violations of the law have
been shown to exist, the [FTC] has broad discretion in devising a remedy adequate to prevent the
same or similar violations in the future."), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966); Consumer Sales
Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404, 408 (2d Cir. 1952) ("The fact that [the individual] resigned as an
officer and director and disposed of his stock before the order was entered does not make erroneous his inclusion in it....
[The corporate defendant] is not the only vehicle through which such
acts may be accomplished in the future ....
[The Commission was warranted in not dismissing
the complaint against him."), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912 (1953).
139. The FTCA provides that a district court can levy civil penalties against a person who
violates a cease and desist order only when the person has actual knowledge that the activity is
unfair or deceptive. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2) (1994).
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from these evasive tactics, thereby making the order's enforcement virtually
impossible.
The FTC's decision in In re Gold Bullion International, Ltd.1" illustrates the rationale underlying the controlling person doctrine. In that case,
Gold Bullion International, Ltd. (Gold Bullion) imported into the United States
gold coin reproductions of various German, Mexican, and Austrian government currencies. Gold Bullion sold and distributed the reproductions to coin
dealers for resale to consumers. Although the coins were not issued by any
government or used in exchange, none of the coins were marked
"copy." Utilizing the FTCA's enforcement provisions, government officials
issued a complaint seeking a cease and desist order against Gold Bullion and
its corporate officers on the basis that their importation and sale of copies of
government coins without marking them as such constituted a deceptive sales
practice in violation of section 5 of the FTCA. 4
The complaint named Gold Bullion's corporate officers in their individual
capacities, including H. Kenneth Costello, Walter N. Thompson, and William
H. Bogart. 42 All three participated in Gold Bullion's formation, contributed
to its initial capitalization, and were major shareholders. 4 3 Since the
corporation's inception, Costello had served as its president, Thompson as its
vice-president and treasurer, and Bogart as its secretary and legal counsel.'" These three individuals, along with a fourth person whom the Commission previously dismissed pursuant to a consent order, were solely
responsible for Gold Bullion's ownership and control.145 Costello and
Thompson were responsible for Gold Bullion's daily operations and management.' 46 Although Bogart did not actively participate in the corporation's
daily business operations, he advised the company regarding the legality of
marketing and selling the gold coin reproductions in the United States. 47
In reviewing the initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
on appeal, the Commissioner adopted the following statements from the AUL's
opinion as correctly setting forth the law regarding individual liability under
the FTCA:
It is well settled that to promote the full effectiveness of its orders and
to prevent those orders from being evaded, the Commission has the

140. 92 F.T.C. 196 (1978).
141. Id. at 196.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 199.
144. Id.
145. Gold Bullion, 92 F.T.C. at 199.
146. Id. at 200. The corporation had only two employees besides its officers-a secretarial
employee and a temporary employee. Id.
147. Id.
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authority to name the officers, directors, and stockholders of a corporation
as respondents in their individual capacities when they have played a
significant role in the acts or practices giving rise to the complaint. ....
[Tihe basic purpose of an order directed to individual respondents is to
"prevent recurrenceof the particularviolationsfor which named individuals have been responsible." If the individuals were not responsible for the
violations, then there is little likelihood of recurrence of those violations. 148
Based on the factual finding that "there [were] no objective circumstances
that would preclude, or minimize the likelihood of [the individual defendants] re-entering the coin business in the future," the Commission ruled
that "protection of the public interest and prevention of recurrence of
violations" required the extension of the cease and desist order entered
against Gold Bullion to include "the individuals who founded, operated, and
controlled [Gold Bullion], and were responsible for its practices." 149 Thus,
the Commission's cease and desist order included Costello, Thompson, and
Bogart in their individual capacities.
2. The Standardfor Imposing Individual Liability
The purpose of the controlling person doctrine is to prevent recurring
or future violations of the FTCA. A controlling person is named individually
in a cease and desist order directed to the company in order to prevent the
individual from evading the order in an individual capacity or outside the
corporate structure. 50 To fulfill this purpose, the FTC must establish a
connection between the individual defendant and the unlawful practice; that
is, the evidence must suggest that the individual will likely engage in the
unlawful practice in the future as an individual. Accordingly, the federal
decisions recognize a culpability requirement and restrict the imposition of
controlling person liability for a corporation's use of unfair or deceptive acts
to those officers, directors, or shareholders who knew of and participated
in, or failed to exercise their authority to stop, the unlawful acts. 51 Mere

148. Id. at 210-11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86
F.T.C. 1532, 1565 (1975), appeal denied, 553 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1977)).
149. Id. at 224-25 (footnote omitted) (citing In re Virginia Mortgage Exch., Inc., 87 F.T.C.
182, 202-03 (1976); In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1565 (1975), appeal denied,
553 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1977)).
150. See United States v. Bestline Prods. Corp., 412 F. Supp. 754, 764 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
151. See, e.g., FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir.) ("Once
corporate liability is established, the FTC must show that the individual defendants participated
directly in the practices or acts or had authority to control them .... The FTC must then
demonstrate that the individual had some knowledge of the practices." (citations omitted)), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989); FTC v. Patriot Alcohol Testers, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 851, 859 (D.
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ownership and control of an offending corporation whose employees have
committed the unlawful practices is not enough to justify naming the
officers, directors, and shareholders in their individual capacities in a cease
and desist order. 52 A similar rule exists under the federal securities laws:
in order to impose controlling person liability, a plaintiff must show not
only that the defendant had actual power or influence over the controlled
person, but
that the defendant was also a culpable participant in the illegal
15 3
activity.
Coro, Inc. v. FFC 154 demonstrates this limitation on controlling
person liability under the FTCA. Coro, Inc. (Coro), a large, publicly held
corporation, sold and distributed a special line of jewelry and watches to socalled "catalogue houses. "155 As part of its distribution process, Coro
furnished printed sheets to the catalogue houses for insertion in their
catalogues.156 The sheets contained two prices: one at which a purchaser
could buy the product from the catalogue house and another fictitious "list"

Mass. 1992) ("To hold an individual liable for the deceptive acts or practices of a corporate
entity, the FTC must establish the following three required elements: first, the FTC must prove
that the individual had knowledge that the corporation engaged in dishonest or fraudulent conduct;
second, the FTC must prove that the individual participated in the acts or had authority to control
the conduct; and third, the FTC must show customer reliance." (citations omitted)); FTC v.
National Bus. Consultants, 781 F. Supp. 1136, 1152 (E.D. La. 1991) ("In order to attach
individual liability for corporate unfair or deceptive practices, the [FTC] must show that the individual knew the corporation was engaged in dishonest or fraudulent conduct .... The [FTC]
must also show that the defendants directly participated in acts or had authority to control the
conduct of the corporation." (citations omitted)); FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp.
1282, 1292 (D. Minn. 1985) ("mhe FTC must prove that the individual had knowledge that
Kitco or one or more of its agents engaged in dishonest or fraudulent conduct.. . . In addition,
the FTC must show that the defendants directly participated in the acts or had the authority to
control the conduct." (citations omitted)); see Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431,
1439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986). See generally Richard A. Whiting, Antitrust
and the CorporateExecutive, 47 VA. L. REv. 929, 965-72 (1961) (discussing early cases under
the FTCA).
152. See Standard Educators, Inc. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 401, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (vilkey, J.,
dissenting); Flotill Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224, 233 (9th Cir. 1966). Cf. Barrett Carpet
Mills, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 635 F.2d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that
the Consumer Product Safety Commission improperly included the company president in a cease
and desist order issued under the Flammable Fabrics Act when sole basis for inclusion was that
the individual was an officer of the corporation involved in the violation).
153. Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987); Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982);
Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594
F.2d 388, 393-94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Walker v. Cardinal Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 690 F. Supp. 494, 500 (E.D. Va. 1988).
154. 338 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965).
155. Id. at 150.
156. Id.
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or "retail" price. The practice falsely implied that the catalogue price was
one-half the ordinary retail price charged for the product.' 5 7
The FTC sought a cease and desist order against Coro and against
Coro's president, largest stockholder, and chairman of the board of
directors, as an individual) 58 Despite the individual defendant's own
testimony that "he had 'overall corporate responsibility' and 'responsibility
for the acts and practices of the corporation' and that he made the decision
to put Coro into the catalogue house business,"' 59 the court of appeals
held that the FTC erred in including him personally in the cease and desist
order when there was no evidence that he was aware of the corporation's
participation in unlawful pricing practices or that he was personally involved
in Coro's unlawful conduct. 10
In Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC,' a decision cited by the South
Carolina Court of Appeals in C & L Corp.,162 the defendants were sole
shareholders and officers of a corporation that sold cookware and dinnerware through door-to-door salesmen. The salesmen falsely represented to
potential customers that they could get a special low price by sending in a
certain number of box tops from specified soap manufacturers' products. 63 In holding the shareholders and officers individually liable under
the FTCA for the salesmen's misrepresentations, the Second Circuit
emphasized the need for some degree of actual culpability by controlling
persons to impose liability:
The [shareholders and officers] argue that they had no knowledge of
the salesmen's false statements and neither authorized nor participated
in their making. The [FTC], however, found that "by furnishing the
salesmen with order forms falsely representing that they were making
a special offer, by permitting the salesmen to request purchasers to
collect box tops and by furnishing self-addressed envelopes for the
handling of the box tops, respondents actively encouraged and participated in making the said false representations." . . . The [FTC] found that
"[t]he evidence shows that the above-described sales approach was the
usual and typical sales method, of salesmen selling [the corporation's]
products." It is also obvious that the [shareholders and officers] knew
that the "Special Offer" order blanks supplied to the salesmen would de-

157. Id.
158. Id. at 151.
159. Coro, Inc., 338 F.2d at 154.
160. Id. (distinguishing Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (ist Cir. 1964)).
161. 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912 (1953).
162. State ex. rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984).
See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
163. Consumer Sales Corp., 198 F.2d at 406.
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ceive customers since the prices stated thereon were the customary and
regular prices for the merchandise offered. . . . Mhe finding that the
[shareholders and officers] "actively encouraged and participated in
making" the false representations is amply supported by the evidence ....164

Consistent with the objectives of preventing the evasion of cease and
desist orders and punishing those who knowingly violate such orders, the
controlling person decisions under the FTCA recognize a culpability requirement. The imposition of personal liability on the officers, directors, and
shareholders of corporate defendants is limited to situations in which the
individuals knew of and participated in, or failed to exercise their authority
to stop, the unlawful conduct.
V. LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING A
CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR IMPOSING CONTROLLING PERSON
LIABILITY IN PRIVATE DAMAGES ACTIONS UNDER THE MVUTPA
The South Carolina legislature should ensure that individuals are not
held personally liable in private damages actions under the MVUTPA based
solely on their status as officers, directors, or persons in control of an
offending motor vehicle dealership. Instead, to warrant individual liability,
a plaintiff in a private damages action should be required to prove that the
officer, director, or control person knew of and participated in, or failed to
exercise his authority to stop, the unlawful conduct. Compelling legal and
policy arguments support the imposition of a culpability requirement.
A. Harmonizing the MVUTPA
with State Corporationand Tort Laws and the UTPA
Subjecting officers, directors, and shareholders to liability for a private
damages award based solely on their relationship to a dealership that
violated the MVUTPA is repugnant to the policies embodied in the doctrines
of limited shareholder liability and the corporate veil. As previously
discussed, these policies are deeply imbedded in South Carolina's laws, such
as the South Carolina Business Corporation Act (Business Corporation

164. Id. at 406-07 (emphasis added); see also Rayex Corp. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 290, 295 (2d
Cir. 1963) ("The [FTC]'s order is ... modified in conformity with its concession on oral
argument that [a corporate officer], who neither personally engaged in [the corporate defendant]'s
sales and advertising practices nor was in a position to exercise any control over such matters,
was improperly included."); Pati-Port Inc. v. FTC, 313 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1963) ("It is
... clear that the respondent ...

was President of the corporation at the time the practices

complained of were carried on and that he knew of and approved of them.").
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Act),"~ and are fundamental to its business and economic institutions. In
effect, the corporation and its shareholders are no longer separate and
distinct entities if victims of unfair trade practices are allowed to reach the
shareholders' assets in satisfaction of the corporation's liabilities. Such a
rule stifles the investment of new capital that is so crucial to the continued
growth and stability of the motor vehicle industry by imposing excessive
risks on investors of motor vehicle dealerships. Shareholders of motor
vehicle dealerships would risk not only the price paid for their stock, but
their home, property, and personal assets as well.
Conversely, limiting the imposition of personal liability to situations in
which the officers, directors, or shareholders knew of and participated in the
unlawful conduct is consistent with the Business Corporation Act and the
doctrines of limited shareholder liability and the corporate veil. Corporation
law and tort law have traditionally provided exceptions to limited shareholder liability and the corporate veil. Most notably, officers, directors, and
shareholders are not immunized from personal liability for the torts in which
they participated or which they authorized or directed."6 Shareholders are
also held personally liable when they abuse the corporate form for personal
gain, the corporation is inadequately capitalized, or corporate formalities
have not been properly complied with. 67 The courts have disregarded the
general rule of immunity when the corporation and its principals, although
separate in form, are really the same.
State ex rel. McLeod v. Whiteside"6 ' illustrates how the doctrines of
limited shareholder liability and the corporate veil can be harmonized with
controlling person liability under the unfair trade practices legislation. That
case utilized the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" to hold shareholders personally liable for a corporation's violation of the UTPA based on the
finding that the corporate structure was a mere umbrella for deceptive
conduct and because the principals behaved as if the corporation did not
exist.'69 The case involved the attorney general's suit against Southeastern
Energy Systems, Inc. (Southeastern) and its two owners, Richard Whiteside
and Louis Moseley, Jr., for a permanent injunction prohibiting the
defendants from representing to consumers that certain electrical devices
known as the "Energymizer" and the "Tightwad" would save electrical
energy.17 0 The defendants represented to customers and potential customers that the devices would save energy and reduce a person's electricity bill

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-101 to 33-20-105 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1994).
See supra notes 8-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
Case No. 79-CP-40-0671 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Richland July 17, 1981).
Id. slip op. at 16.
Id. slip op. at 1-2.
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by ten to forty percent by suppressing the "transient voltage surges" or
power surges which enter a home's electrical system. 7'
The court found that the defendants had engaged in unfair and deceptive
practices because the devices did not in fact save energy or reduce a
person's electricity bill by any measurable degree and, therefore, entered a
permanent injunction against Southeastern and the individual owners. 172 In
holding Whiteside and Moseley individually liable, the court found that the
evidence clearly established that "the corporate Defendant was a corporation
in name only."" Corporate records had not been maintained, shareholders and directors meetings were never held, corporate minutes were
unavailable, corporate bank accounts were used to pay Moseley's personal
bills, and it was uncertain exactly who held the various offices in the
corporation and who were the corporation's directors. 74 Based on these
facts, the court held:
Defendants Whiteside and Moseley owned, dominated and managed
Southeastern. The only apparent evidence that a corporation ever existed
is the corporate charter and checkbook in evidence before the Court. It
would indeed be unfair and unjust to immunize the individual Defendants behind a corporation for (sic) responsibility for their actions solely
because they obtained a corporate charter and opened a bank account
prior to engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices. When individuals behind a corporation act as though no corporation exists, they may
properly be held accountable for activities conducted under the corporate
name.

175

The court further held that when a corporation is a mere shell its controlling
persons "cannot bury their heads in the sand and close their eyes to actions
being taken under the corporate name and thus evade liability for actions
ostensibly taken by the corporation. " 76

171. Id. slip op. at 5-6.
172. Id. slip op. at 15-16.
173. Whiteside, Case No. 79-CP-40-0671, slip op. at 12.
174. Id. slip op. at 12-13.
175. Id. slip op. at 16 (citations omitted).
176. Id. (citations omitted). In a subsequent securities fraud suit seeking recovery of money
invested in the corporation, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held Whiteside personally liable
under the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (Law.
Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1995), as a controlling person of Southeastern. McGaha v. Mosley, 283
S.C. 268, 275, 322 S.E.2d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 1984) ("As an officer and controlling person of
the seller, Whiteside was liable to [the investor] to the same extent as the corporation."). Under
the Uniform Securities Act, every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller of securities
and every partner, officer, or director of such a seller is liable to the same extent as the seller
"unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
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In addition to harmonizing the MVUTPA with the policies reflected in
the Business Corporation Act and the doctrines of limited shareholder
liability and the corporate veil, ensuring that individuals are not held liable
under the MVUTPA based solely on their status as officers, directors, and
shareholders of a motor vehicle dealership will avoid the unusual result in
which liability exists under the MVUTPA but not under the UTPA.17 As
discussed above, in Plowman v. Bagnal 8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that a private litigant cannot hold the controlling persons of a
corporate defendant personally liable for a corporate violation of the UTPA
merely because of their relationship to the corporation. An individual's
status as an officer, director, or person in control of the affairs of an entity
is insufficient by itself to warrant controlling person liability in a private
damages action under the UTPA. Because the particular conduct regulated
by the UTPA and MVUTPA is virtually indistinguishable 79 and the
statutes' purposes are identical, there is no practical or theoretical basis for
differentiating between the two with regard to officer, director, or controlling person liability. A consistent standard of liability should be imposed
under both acts.
B. Harmonizing the MVUTPA with the FTCA
All of the controlling person cases under the FTCA have arisen in the
context of government suits for injunctive relief or civil penalties. 810 The
federal courts have never applied the controlling person doctrine to a private
action for monetary damages. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that the
federal courts will ever address this issue because of the unavailability of a
private cause of action under the FTCA. 8 Despite the lack of federal
precedent in the area of private damages actions, the MVUTPA, like the
UTPA, specifically instructs South Carolina courts to apply the statute by

the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability is alleged to exist." S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1500 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
177. See Anderson v. FDIC, 918 F.2d 1139, 1143 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that courts should,
if possible, construe statutes harmoniously, especially if they deal with the same subject matter,
even if apparent conflict exists); Higgins v. State, 307 S.C. 446, 449, 415 S.E.2d 799, 801
(1992) (same).
178. __ S.C. _, 450 S.E.2d 36 (1994). See supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
179. See supranotes 55-59 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
181. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. CocaCola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 449 F. Supp. 132
(D.S.C. 1976), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1978).
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reference to the FTCA." Thus, the decisions under the FTCA should be
persuasive in interpreting liability under the MVUTPA.
The government enforcement decisions under the FTCA recognize a
culpability requirement and limit personal liability for officers, directors,
and controlling persons to those situations in which the individuals knew of
and participated in, or failed to exercise their authority to stop, the unlawful
conduct."13 As in private damages actions under the UTPA, an individual's
status as an officer, director, or person in control of the affairs of an entity
is insufficient by itself to warrant controlling person liability under the
FTCA. Likewise, in the context of private damages actions under the
MVUTPA, the legislature should require plaintiffs to prove that the officer,
director, or shareholder knew of and participated in the unlawful conduct to
warrant individual liability.

C. Recognizing the DissimilaritiesBetween Government
Enforcement Actions and PrivateDamages Actions Under
Unfair Trade PracticesLegislation
Even if in the context of government enforcement of the MVUTPA
liability is imposed on an individual solely because of his status as an
officer, director, or shareholder of an offending motor vehicle dealership,
such an imposition does not necessarily support a similar result in a private
damages action. Different rules are justified because the primary objective
sought to be achieved by extending liability to officers, directors, and
shareholders in the context of government enforcement of the MVUTPA is
not furthered by the imposition of similar liability in a private damages
action under the Act. The purpose of naming the officers, directors, and
shareholders of a corporation in a cease and desist or injunctive order is not
to punish them for a past violation of the law, but to prevent them from
evading the order outside of the corporate structure."s Officers, directors,
and shareholders possess the power to dissolve a corporation against which
a cease and desist or injunctive order has been directed and, therefore, are
capable of continuing the unlawful practices in the future by reorganizing
the corporation under a different name.
In contrast, the major thrust of a private action for monetary damages
is not to prevent recurring violations of the law, but to compensate the
plaintiff for damages incurred as a result of a past violation."s In pursuit

182.
1991).
183.
184.
185.

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985) and § 56-15-30(b) (Law. Co-op.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134-35, 138-39 and accompanying text.
These concepts are reflected in the statutory requirements under the MVUTPA and
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of this objective, it does not matter that the individual officers, directors,
and shareholders may later dissolve the corporation and continue the
unlawful practices under a different name because the dissolved corporation
remains liable to the plaintiff for any claims against it."8 6 In addition, in
those instances where the corporate defendant is insolvent and the company
is little more than an empty shell with assets concentrated in the hands of its
officers, directors, and shareholders, the doctrine of "piercing the corporate
veil" is available to hold the corporate principals personally liable for the
corporation's violation of the MVUTPA. Consequently, it is unnecessary to
impose individual liability on officers, directors, or shareholders to protect
a plaintiff injured as the result of a corporate violation of the unfair trade
practices statutes.
Furthermore, important substantive and procedural protections that are
present in government enforcement actions under the unfair trade practices
legislation are lacking in private damages actions under the MVUTPA. 7
For example, under the government enforcement scheme of the FTCA, the
FTC issues a complaint to an offending corporation or person setting forth
the unlawful business practices sought to be curtailed. The corporation or
person then has the opportunity to show cause why a cease and desist order
should not be issued against the particular practice involved.' If a cease
and desist order is issued, a district court can levy civil penalties against a
corporation or person for violating the order only when the corporation or
person possessed actual knowledge that their activity was unfair or deceptive
and was unlawful under the Act.18 9
However, a plaintiff in a private damages action under the MVUTPA
can recover double actual damages, plus costs and attorney's fees, without
the necessity of showing that the defendant violated a previously issued
cease and desist or injunctive order or that the defendant possessed actual
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful under the Act."9° A private
plaintiff need only show that a violation occurred which caused him injury
compensable under the statute. This distinction is especially important
considering that unfair trade practices statutes such as the MVUTPA contain
"words of proscription [that] are broad, potentially encompassing a wide

UTPA, respectively, that a person must have been "injured in [their] business or property" or
have "suffered anl ascertainable loss of money or property" as the result of a statutory violation
before a private cause of action can be stated. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op.
1985) and § 56-15-110(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
186. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-14-101 to -107 (Law. Co-op. 1990); CLEVELAND ET AL.,
supra note 9, §§ 36.01, .06.
187. See Norton, supra note 28, at 642-45; Richardson, supra note 55, at 23.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1994).
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2) (1994).
190. See SC. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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range of conduct, including conduct not yet examined by any
court."191 The absence in private damages actions of the important
substantive and procedural safeguards that are present in government
enforcement actions makes the imposition of a culpability requirement in the
private litigation setting even more compelling.
D. Avoiding Overly Strict
Unfair Trade PracticesLegislation
Imposing liability based solely on an individual's shareholder or
officeholder status is counterproductive to the purposes underlying unfair
trade practice legislation. Fault or culpability becomes irrelevant if liability
is imposed merely on the basis of stock ownership or office. The implications of such a rule of law are troublesome. For example, assuming that the
officers or directors of a motor vehicle dealership took every conceivable
precaution to prevent the dealership's employees from committing unfair
trade practices, they would still be automatically responsible for the illegal
acts of their subordinates, whether or not those acts were known to them
and even if the acts were done contrary to express instructions. Moreover,
the chance that an officer, director, or control person will be completely
unaware of a particular instance of employee misconduct is more than
abstract. Today's typical complex business features decentralized functions
and broadly delegated responsibilities. It is plainly unrealistic to expect the
officers, directors, and control persons of large organizations to be able to
police the actions of every employee or subordinate.
Not only would the imposition of liability based simply on one's status
ensnare innocent individuals, but it would penalize those officers and
directors who, after learning of suspected illegal activity, took action to
repudiate the conduct and prevent its recurrence. By ferreting out the unfair
trade practices of corporate employees, an officer or director renders his
personal assets vulnerable to the claims of injured plaintiffs. Thus, the
imposition of liability without fault discourages officers and directors who
did not participate in or know of the unlawful conduct at the time of its
commission from punishing misconduct by subordinates or taking remedial
measures to prevent future violations of the law.
Finally, the imposition of liability based solely on an individual's status
leads to overdeterrence. Prudent and cautious businesspersons might shun
altogether the motor vehicle business because of the unavoidable risks of

191. Norton, supra note 28, at 642. For example, one commentator has remarked that
"[s]ection 39-5-20 [of the UTPA] is a masterpiece of vagueness and ambiguity which will insure
that any person or entity sued for anything that has any relationship with trade or commerce will
also be sued for committing an unfair trade practice." Note, supra note 47, at 854 n.179.
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liability. Consequently, such a rule of law would not only sweep up the
malevolent and dishonest motor vehicle dealers in its broad net, but would
also dissuade honest entrepreneurs and investors from investing in the industry. Instead of imposing the "strictest honesty in commercial dealings," 192
it would impose the strictest form of liability.
E. Passing ConstitutionalScrutiny
Important constitutional restrictions may prohibit any construction of the
MVUTPA that imposes liability on an individual solely because of his status
as an officer, director, or person in control of a motor vehicle dealership
that has violated the Act. Such a construction divides officers, directors, and
control persons into separate classes-those of entities selling motor vehicles
and those of all other entities. Moreover, the members of the motor vehicle
class receive disparate treatment under the law in that they are denied the
protections of limited shareholder liability and the corporate veil while
similarly situated officers, directors, and shareholders of other entities still
receive these protections. Although a thorough discussion of the constitutional issues is beyond the scope of this article, imposing liability without fault
only on the officers, directors, and controlling persons of motor vehicle
dealerships arguably violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the South Carolina1" and United States 194 Constitutions.
The Due Process Clause mandates that any legislation "which deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property, must have a rational basis-the reason
for the deprivation may not be so inadequate that the judiciary will
characterize it as arbitrary.""195 Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause forbids "irrational and unjustified classifications."196 Courts generally review

192. Day, supra note 27, at 486.
193. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws").
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,,§ 1 ("nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws").
195. Hamilton v. Board of Trustees, 282 S.C. 519, 524, 319 S.E.2d 717, 721 (Ct. App.
1984).
196. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 300 S.C. 142, 161,
386 S.E.2d 775, 786 (1989). The South Carolina Supreme Court has explained the concept of
equal protection of the laws as follows:
mhe constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws requires that all persons
shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed.... The equal protection guaranty is
intended to secure equality of protection not only for all, but against all similarly
situated.
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economic and public welfare legislation under this "rational basis"
standard." 9 A legislative classification will satisfy the standard "if: (1) the
classification created by the statute is rationally related to its legislative
purpose; (2) the members of the class are treated like those similarly
situated; and (3) the classification rests on some rational basis."'"9
To determine whether any state action employing a classification
violates the due process or equal protection guarantees, courts focus on the
nexus between the statute's objective and the classification provided to
accomplish that objective.199 Assuming that the statute's objective is a
proper one, whether a legislative classification passes constitutional scrutiny
depends on the degree of congruence or the "fit" between the group of
individuals included in the legislative classification and the group of
individuals tainted with the mischief at which the law is aimed at preventing.' As an oft-cited commentary states: "A reasonable classification is
one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law.""°

The legislative purpose behind the MVUTPA is to protect persons from
the fraudulent and deceptive trade practices of motor vehicle dealerships
doing business in South Carolina.' South Carolina courts would have
little difficulty finding this to be a legitimate goal. To uphold a construction
of the MVUTPA's statutory language that imposes liability based solely on
an individual's status as an officer, director, or person in control of a motor
vehicle dealership that violated the Act, the courts must find a reasonable

Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 472, 229
S.E.2d 718, 722 (1976) (citation omitted).
197. See Prudential Property & Casualty Co. v. Insurance Comm'n, 534 F. Supp. 571, 576
(D.S.C. 1982), aff'd, 699 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1983); ExparteEstate of Evans, 299 S.C. 366, 384
S.E.2d 748 (1989), cert. denied sub nom. Lynch v. Fleming, 439 U.S. 1081 (1990).
198. Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142, 147, 394 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1990).
199. See Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979), cert.denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980); Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869 (1978);
Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); 19 S.C. JUR. ConstitutionalLaw§ 85
(1993).
200. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The EqualProtectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REv. 341 (1949).
201. Id. at 346.
202. The legislative findings of the MVUTPA, which are found only in the session laws, state
in their entirety:
SECTION 1. FINDINGS. The General Assembly finds that the distribution of
motor vehicles in the State of South Carolina vitally affects the general economy of
the State and the public interest and public welfare, and in the exercise of its police
power, it is necessary to regulate motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers
and their representatives doing business in South Carolina in order to prevent frauds,
impositions and other abuses upon its citizens.
Act of May 22, 1972, No. 1237, § 1, 1972 S.C. Acts 2419.
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distinction between the officers, directors, and persons in control of motor
vehicle dealerships and those of other entities. Furthermore, the distinction
must be rationally related to the statutory purpose of protecting individuals
from fraudulent and deceptive trade practices. 0 3
It is difficult to imagine how the imposition of liability on persons who
may have no personal involvement with the disputed transaction at all other
than their status as officers, directors, or persons in control of an entity
selling motor vehicles can be considered rationally related to the purpose of
protecting persons from fraudulent and deceptive trade practices. The
classification involved is egregiously overinclusive. It imposes a burden
(liability for damages) upon a larger group of individuals than are tainted
with the mischief sought to be eliminated (deception and fraud upon
innocent persons).' It would appear to be unreasonable and irrational to
suppose that because a motor vehicle dealership has committed fraudulent
and deceptive trade practices, all the officers, directors, and other persons
in control of the dealership are guilty of these practices as well. A

203. See Bauer, 271 S.C. at 231, 246 S.E.2d at 875 (requiring a "reasonable relationship
between the public purpose to be achieved and the means chosen to effectuate that purpose");
Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 124, 245 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1978) (stating that "the requirement
of equal protection is not fulfilled unless the classification rests upon some difference which bears
a reasonable and just relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected").
204. See Rainey v. Ramey, 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1078
(1980). In Ramey the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an
automobile guest statute that required injured automobile guests or passengers to prove intentional
or reckless misconduct on the part of their host drivers to recover therefrom. One of the
rationales proffered to support the constitutionality of the statute was that it discouraged collusive
lawsuits between guests and their hosts. In striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the court
rejected this rationale as follows:
The "collusion prevention" rationale is similarly untenable. Although the guest
statute may prevent some collusive suits between hosts and their passengers, the
statute's overinclusiveness is devastating as it operates to bar the great majority of
valid claims.
"mhe wholesale elimination of all guests' causes of action for negligence does
not treat similarly situated persons equally, but instead improperly discriminates
against guests on the basis of a factor which bears no significant relation to actual
collusion."
We believe the proper way to ferret out fraudulent actions is to impose existing
civil law sanctions rather than to exclude an entire class of claims. Therefore, we
cannot accept the premise that the supposed prevention of collusive lawsuits may
justify a statute which bars meritorious litigation.
Id. at 685, 258 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212, 215 (Cal. 1973)). Similarly, the wholesale deprivation of the protections of limited shareholderliability and the corporate veil from the officers, directors, and control persons of motor vehicle dealerships does not
treat similarly situated persons equally. Instead this deprivation improperly discriminates against
the officers, directors, and persons in control of motor vehicle dealerships on the basis of a factor
that bears no reasonable relation to fraud or deception.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss2/7

40

Rosen and Blanchard: Controlling Person Liability for Motor Vehicle Dealer Violations

1996]

DEALERSHIP CONTROLLING PERSON LIABILITY

classification based on one's officeholding or shareholding status bears no
reasonable relation to the purpose of preventing fraud or deception.
Individuals who own stock or hold office in a motor vehicle dealership are
no more or less likely than officeholders and shareholders in other
businesses to engage in fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Therefore, the
classification is arguably not rationally related to the statutory purpose and
any construction of the MVUTPA which imposes liability based solely on
an individual's status as an officer, director, or person in control of a motor
vehicle dealership is likely unconstitutional.
VI. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED SOLUTION

In light of the South Carolina Court of Appeals's recent decision in
Rowe v. Hyat205 it is certain that private litigants will continue to name
the controlling persons of motor vehicle dealerships as defendants in actions
brought under the MVUTPA against the dealership. This will occur even
when the controlling persons did not know about or participate in the
deceptive or fraudulent conduct forming the basis of the suit. Compelling
reasons support the modification of existing law to ensure that individuals
are not held personally liable in a private damages action under the
MVUTPA based solely on their status as officers, directors, or persons in
control of an offending dealership.
The General Assembly can accomplish this modification through a
simple amendment to the current statute. Specifically, the legislature could
amend section 56-15-110 of the MVUTPA, which sets forth the provisions
granting private plaintiffs a right of action, by adding the following
subsection:
(5) An officer, director, shareholder, or other person in active
control of the activities of a corporation, partnership, trust, or other
entity shall not be held personally liable for the acts or practices of the
entity, except that he may become personally liable by reason of his
knowledge of and participation in, authorization of, or acquiescence in
acts or practices forbidden by this chapter.20 6
Without harming or reducing the protections afforded to deceived and
defrauded consumers, this amendment would go far toward ensuring that
blameless individuals are not held personally liable for the misconduct of

205. _ S.C. _,
452 S.E.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1994).
206. The correspondingprovision of the South Carolina Motorcycle Unfair Trade Practice Act,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-16-10 to -210 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1994), which was carved out
of the MVUTPA, could be similarly amended. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-16-200 (Law. Co-op.
1991).
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others. The South Carolina legislature should not force the officers, directors, and persons in control of this state's motor vehicle dealerships to be
the insurers of the losses sustained by deceived and defrauded individuals.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss2/7

42

